



Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service



Scientific and Engineering Centre
for Nuclear and Radiation Safety

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TECHNICAL SAFETY
ORGANISATIONS
NETWORK

Methodology of an explosion safety assessment of sorption processes for SNF and waste treatment

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FCF Explosion Accidents


explosions of RW storage tank «Mayak», 1957.

«red oil» explosions:

- Savannah River plant, 1953
- Hanford site, 1953
- Oak Ridge laboratory, 1959
- Savanna River plant, 1975
- «SHK», Seversk, 1993

Sorption equipment explosions

- Fontenay-aux-Roses, 1962
- Plant «Rocky Flats», 1963
- Hanford Site, 1963
- Savannah River, 1964
- Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1965
- Kerr McGee, 1967
- Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1967
- Hanford Site, 1976
- PA «Mayak» и «SHK»



«SHK», Seversk, 1993


The usage of organic resins on Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities




- water conditioning
- selective separation of radionuclides (Pu/Am, Am/Cm)
- preparation chromatography
- LRW processing
- storage of spent resin




Resin Ku-2 (cationit)




Resin VP-1AP




Resin AV-17x8 (Cl⁻ form)




Sorption equipment:




~ m³
~ dm³
~ cm³



Runaway processes with resins




J Therm Anal Calorim (2009) 97:769–774



A-500U with complex thorium gexanitrat in 8 M HNO₃.
1 - with exposure to 2 MGy, 2 - without irradiation.

Theory of runaway reactions



Two main approaches to safety analyse

Experimental study:
(Examples – US SADT test,
DEWAR storage test,...)

Advantage:

Gives direct data about critical conditions

Shortcomings:

- ✓ Expensive
- ✓ Dangerous (not acceptable for radioactive materials)
- ✓ Hard to extrapolate results

Calculating methods

Simplified theories


Numerical simulation

Limitations of «classical» methods:




- only one stage reaction (zero-order reaction, auto-catalytic reaction);
- only simple geometry;
- simple boundary condition;
- not allow to take into account additional external (Fire) and internal heat source (Rad.nuclides).

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Pu}^{238} (\alpha) = 0.57 \text{ W/g} \\ \text{Cm}^{244} (\alpha) = 2.8 \text{ W/g} \\ \text{Cm}^{242} (\alpha) = 122 \text{ W/g} \\ \text{Cs}^{137} (\beta, \gamma) = 0.15 \text{ W/g} \end{array} \right\} \simeq 36 \text{ W/K_cu}$$

The safety assessment scheme



Thermodynamic assessment




$$\Delta T_{ad} \approx Q / C_p > 500 \text{ } ^\circ\text{C}$$

Adiabatic calculation


Main issues:

- create kinetic model of chemical reactions;
- take into account all heat source during modeling.



NETZSCH STA 449 f3 Jupiter + FTIR Bruker

DSC experiment




Data processing, estimation kinetic parameters and modeling by using TSS (CISP spb)



Developing the ‘formal’ model of chemical reactions



n - order reactions → $w_i = k_{0i} * \exp\left(-\frac{E_{a_i}}{RT}\right) * (1 - \alpha)^{n_i}$



	A to B	C to D	D to E
$\ln(k_{0i})$, $\ln(1/s)$	31,1±1,1	33,2±1,2	24,6±0,9
$E_{\text{a},i}$, kJ/mol	140±4,2	172,1±4,4	151,2±3,9
N_i	0,8±0,06	1,35±0,12	3,05±0,35
Q_i , kJ/kg	130±18	2090±120	6450±270



proto reaction	$\longrightarrow q_i = k_{0_i} \times \exp\left(-\frac{E_{a_i}}{RT}\right) \times \alpha^{n_2} \times (1 - \alpha)^{n_3} Q_i$
$\ln(k_0), \ln(1/c)$	$E_a, \text{ kJ/mol}$
21,1	93,5
n_2	$Q, \text{ kJ/kg}$
0,41	287
n_3	n_3
	0,62

Validation of the models


Scale Up experiment:

from 10 - 15 mg to 2 - 3 g (~200 times)



Experimental cell



Mathematical model
of cell



Results of Scale Up experiment:




Adiabatic calculation (conservative assumption)

τ_{op} – time of normal operation

τ_{ad} – time to maximum rate under adiabatic condition

Safety criteria:




Non-adiabatic calculation

- critical temperature (step 3)
- time to maximum rate (step 4)

τ_{op} – time of normal operation


τ_{ind} – time to maximum rate



Safety criteria:


$\tau_{op} < \tau_{ind}$

Parameters $(\tau_{op}) < \text{SL}(T, P)$



Difference between τ_{ind} and τ_{ad}



AV-17*8 in nitrate form



Analysis of process parameters deviations

Major events are recommended to be considered:

- errors or failures that lead to the loading of additional heat sources (increased concentration of radionuclides);
- process shutdown for a long period;
- contact of the resin with high concentration nitric acid;
- errors in reagent dosing sequence.





Approach allows

- to assess safety under normal operation condition;
 - to estimate influence of process parameter deviation, including scenario of DBAs and DEC;
 - to estimate time to take a decision;
 - to develop emergency measures (estimation of effectiveness);
 - to justify safety for NFCF operator.
-
- **for TSO it allows to save a resource, when process parameters far away from critical points, and provide detailed safety assessment with taking into account many aspects, if necessary**



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Thank you for attention!