# HERCA-WENRA approach for better cross-border coordination of protective actions during the early phase of a nuclear accident







# **Overview**

- Introduction
- HERCA-WENRA-Approach
- Implementation
- Conclusions







# HERCA: Heads of European Radiological protection Competent Authorities

**32 countries** (the 28 EU MS + IS, NO, CH)

**63 organisations** (RPA + TSO), 311 nominations

Observers EC, IAEA, WHO, US FDA, OECD/NEA









# **WENRA: Western European Nuclear Regulators Association**

### 18 Members

- Belgium
- BulğariaCzech Republic
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Hungary
- Italy
- Lithuania
- Romania
- Slovak Republic
- Slovenia
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- The Netherlands
- Ukraine
- United Kingdom



## 10 Observers

- Armenia
- Austria
- Belarus
- Canada
- Denmark
- Ireland
- Luxemburg
- Norway
- Poland
- Russian **Federation**








# **HERCA-WENRA** Approach


Adopted in October 2014 in Stockholm












## **Nuclear Accident Situation**



A nuclear accident occurs in country A that affects the territories of neighbouring countries


All countries are fully sovereign in organizing the emergency







# **Possible Implementation of Protective Actions**







## **Differences**

- Types of protective actions
- Criteria for intervention levels for introducing protective actions (in terms of projected dose)
- Operational intervention levels (action levels based on measurements)
- Methods for assessing source terms
- Methods for radiological impact assessment and dispersion modelling
- Definitions of emergency planning zones
- ...







# **Overview**

- Introduction
- HERCA-WENRA-Approach
- Implementation
- Conclusions







# General Objective of the HERCA - WENRA Approach

 Coordination of response in the early phase of an accident between the impacted country with the aim of a coherent response across borders


 Approach jointly approved by HERCA and WENRA on 21 October 2014







# **How to coordinate?**



# **National EP&R Arrangements**

- Before an accident
  - Enhance mutual understanding
  - Build trust

- In case of an accident
  - Early phase of an accident (first hours)
     Do the same as the country where the accident occurred
  - Mid-term (after the first hours)
     Development of a common situation report







## **Protective Actions**

Protective Action	Distance
Evacuation + ITB	up to 5 km
Sheltering + ITB	5 to 20 km

Sheltering is preferred against evacuation under the plume

Protective Action	Distance
Evacuation + ITB	up to 20 km
Sheltering + ITB	up to 100 km

Develop general strategy if extended protective actions would become necessary





# Special case of an extreme event with insufficient Information

- Knowledge of an extreme event or situation creating a risk of core melt and large radioactive release (extreme natural hazard, terrorist attack, ...)
- Lack of sufficient information to rely on the use the regular EP&R arrangements
- Necessity for the safety Authorities to decide and possibly recommend immediate and consistent protective actions to the relevant national Authorities
- Use of «Judgment Evaluation Factors (JEFs)»





# **Evaluation of the Situation**


JEF	Description	Possible values of JEF			
1	Is there a risk of core melt?	Yes	No	Unknown	
2	Is the containment integrity maintained?	Yes	No	Unknown	
3	Is the wind direction?	Steady	Variable	Unknown	







# **Weather conditions**







# **Overview**

- Introduction
- HERCA-WENRA-Approach
- Implementation
- Conclusions







# HERCA's Working Group on Emergencies Action Plan 2015-2017

- Continue to develop a comprehensive approach to coordinate issues of common interest of importance for a good and trustful EP&R.
- Follow-up of the implementation of previous achievements in HERCA member's countries
- Transposition and implementation of the Directive 2013/59/Euratom (Euratom BSS)
- New activities on request and decision of HERCA's BoH







# **Guidance for Bilateral Arrangements**

- Collect good practices from existing arrangements
- Develop simple messages
- Effective coordination of protective actions during the early phase of a nuclear accident
- Help to transpose article 99 "Elaboration of a Guidance for Bilateral Arrangements"



Available on www.herca.org







# **Country fact sheets**

- Give an overview of emergency preparedness and response in a country
- Help to progress in International Cooperation
- Available also in extreme cases
- Country Fact Sheets available for Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands and United Kingdom
- Regular updates necessary







# **Country Fact Sheets**



#### **Switzerland EPR Fact Sheet**

#### **Decision making**

Decisions on protective actions are basically taken by the Federal Council on the basis of application of the Federal NBCN Management Board. The heads of all concerned federal offices (ministries) and other representatives are members of this board. The meetings of this board constitute an accelerated consultation mechanism similar to the one in normal situation.

For urgent protective actions the competence is delegated to the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC).

The implementation of the protective and other response actions is in the responsibility of the local authorities (cantons).


Advice to the decision-making bodies and the responding organisations is provided by the competent federal offices and some specific technical support organisation. The assessment of the plant conditions and the possible off-site consequences is performed by the Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI (regulatory body). The radiological situation is monitored and assessed by NEOC and the Federal office of public health (FOPH), where NEOC is leading the actions in areas under emergency exposure situation and the FOPH those under existing and planned exposure situation

The licensee is obliged to notify the Regulatory Body with no delay of any event fulfilling defined criteria. It is obliged to make information available to the Regulatory Body needed to assess the situation and to determine the necessary protective actions for the public

#### Alarming

The alarming and the instructions regarding urgent protective actions and other response actions is triggered by NEOC. The sirens are activated by the local authorities and the instruction is broadcasted by national and private radio

#### **Organizational structure**



Emergency organizations and response country fact sheet, Switzerland, Version 1, March 2015.





#### **Country** info

Time zone

Internet TLD

Italian, Romansh 8M 40 000 km² NPPs /ele. share

National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC)

#### **Nuclear regulatory body**

#### Radiation protection

Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) Swiss Federal Nuclear Inspectorate (ENSI)

#### **Emergency website**

#### Online measurements https://www.nsr.ch www.ensi.ch/en/topic/measured-value-about-

Bilateral agreements Austria, France, Germany, Italy,

#### RANET capabilities

- Radiation Survey
- Environmental Sampling and Analysis Radiological Assessment and Advice
- Medical Support

#### Nuclear facilities' and population

NPP		Type	MW,	GPS coc	ordinates	5 km pop.	20 km pop.	Comments
Beznau I	KKB I	BWB	1130	47.552192° N	8.231454° E	25 000	250 000	
Beznau II	KKB II	PWR	1130	47.552192° N	8.2314541 E	25 000	250 000	
Gösgen	KKG	BWR	3000	47.386494° N	7.972052" E	30 000	420 000	
Leibstadt	KKL.	BWR	3600	47.602285" N	8.184662° E	25 000	250 000	
Mühleberg	KKM	PWR	1100	46.969160° N	7.269328° E	3 500	580 000	



Planning zone 1 with radius 3 to 5 km and zone 2 with

#### **Emergency classification**

The emergency classes are triggered by specific plant

Situation where special measures have to be taken by the operator to insure the safety of the power plant but without any actual threat offsite.

Site Area Emergency
Loss of defense in depth in the plant requiring an activation of off-site emergency organisations but still without an actual

General Emergency Situation with a potential threat off-site requiring protective

#### actions for the population and other protective actions.

Protection strategy For each type of radiological or nuclear events a predefined strategy is defined. For a nuclear accident this predefined strategy is based on a reference level of 100 mSv. From this protection goal the generic ordinal and the operational intervention levels are derived. The generic intervention levels are derived. The generic intervention levels are derived. implemented in concepts of operations describing the actions to be taken by the different responding organisations (including e.g. special instructions for schools, access control, traffic deviations, etc.)

As soon as the consequences can be assessed the strategy is adapted by a process of justification and optimisation. The new strategy will lead to an optimised Reference Level which will be used to derive new generic criteria and operational

#### Criteria

Protective Action	Olls /EALs	Comments
Precautionary evacuation	100 mSv eff., 2d, ext.+inh.	Zone 1 as an urgent protective action and if safely feasible, in a second step endangered sectors of zone 2 if necessary
Stay indoors for children and pregnant women	1 mSv eff., 2d, ext.+inh.	
Shettering	10 mSv eff., 2d, ext.+inh.	If not enough information zone 1 and zone 2 (endangered sectors)
ITB	50 m9v thy., 2d, inh,	Pre-distributed to the households up to 50 km
Precautionary harvesting and grazing ban	General Emergency	Where protective actions were ordered and up to the Swiss border and up to the alps

For protective actions not listed in the table a dose level of 100 mSv is set as a criteria. This criteria will serve as a criteria for











# **Common Situation Report**

- Initial idea was "second opinion" to the assessment of the accident country
- IAEA-IEC works on a single independent assessment
- IAEA launched EPRIMS (Emergency Preparedness and Response Information Management System)
- Follow-up IAEA's work with regard to
  - EPRIMS
  - Assessment and Prognosis







# **HWA Implementation Status ENSREG Quick Survey 2016**

Has the HERCA-WENRA Approach been submitted to the other main authorities in charge with EP&R?


Has the HERCA-WENRA Approach been presented and discussed with the other main authorities in charge with EP&R?

Has an assessment been started to assess which recommendations of the HERCA-WENRA Approach are not considered by the present national EP&R

Has this assessment been finalized?

Has the discussion started at national level to implement recommendations from the HERCA-WENRA approach?

Has the implementation started?







# **HWA Implementation Status HERCA-WGE Regular Survey**

- HERCA-WGE has developed tracking sheets
- 18 out of 26 member countries already filled them up
- Inhomogeneous answers
- Use CNS-like Procedure in future









# **Objectives**

- To present the HERCA-WENRA Approach
- To explain the main paradigm shift of the Approach
- To associate civil protection and other actors to the implementation process
- To discuss ways to implement the approach at national, bilateral and multinational level







# **HERCA-WENRA** Workshop with Civil Protection


- Further investigations needed
  - The food chain protection, the extension of protective actions at distances beyond the emergency planning zones and the use of non-radiological criteria for deciding on protective actions
  - Prioritization of NPPs near national borders
  - Authorities competent in radiation protection, nuclear safety and civil protection need to continue to work on the implementation of the HWA while taking into account existing international mechanisms, standards etc.
  - Support of EC DG ECHO







# **HERCA-WENRA Workshop with Civil Protection**







# **Overview**

- Introduction
- HERCA-WENRA-Approach
- Implementation
- Conclusions








# The "20 km problems"

## CH-D-F



#### F-B-LUX



**B-NL** 



SI-CRO



BG-RO










# What we do not want ...









# Conclusions (1/2)

- HERCA and WENRA adopted a common position on EP&R for the case of a core melt accident
- Also for the improbable case of a very severe accident with limited information and the need of fast decisions
- Cross border coordination of protective actions, mutual understanding and trust building are on a good way
- Further efforts are needed, let us do it !!







# Conclusions (2/2)

- Radiation and nuclear safety Authorities will continue to promote compatible response arrangements and protection strategies in Europe
- These Authorities are committed to engage discussion with their national Authorities in charge of Civil Protection, in view of the implementation of the HERCA-WENRA approach
- A first step was done with the Workshop in Bled, Slovenia and the involvement of Civil Protection Competent Authorities



